Arbitration and the Judiciary¹

 

By NILS MANGÅRD, Judge of the Svea Court of Appeal and President of the Public Consumer Complaints Board.

 

1. Advantages and disadvantages of arbitration versus court litigation

 

As we all know there are two systems of solving business disputes, domestic as well as international, which are provided by the legislations of most countries in the world: You can lodge a claim in a court of law or you can start arbitration proceedings. (In the field of consumer protection there are often also other methods of solving disputes, but such disputes normally do not have an international character, and will therefore not be dealt with in this lecture.) The advantages and disadvantages of the two systems of conflict solving from the point of view of the businessman are often summarized under the following headings:
    Speed. A speedy solution of a dispute is of course of great importance to business. A late decision may not only fail to provide a true settlement, but may also create fresh problems.
    Court litigation is of necessity slow. This is a prerequisite of judicial security. Then comes the possibility of appeal from the judgment rendered by the court of first instance, in many countries first to an appellate court and then to the Supreme Court. The time between the issue of the writ and the final judgment in big business cases may well amount to 5—7 years. Professor Bernardo M. Cremades in a paper on "Arbitration and Business" submitted to the VIth International Arbitration Congress in Mexico City in March, 1978 rightly points out that "in the end, the parties may secure a first-rate judgement following a brilliant exposition of the case, but without i providing a real decision; it comes so late that perhaps it satisfies neither ot them".
    Arbitration usually is a quicker way of arriving at a final and binding solution of a dispute, as in most countries no appeal from an arbitral award to the courts is allowed on the merits. But also arbitration proceedings take time. In spite of fairly short time-limits prescribed by the rules of arbitration institutions (or by provisions of domestic arbitration law) it may well take the parties in international cases up to two years or more to get an award: the persons involved — arbitrators, parties, their lawyers and witnesses — may live in quite different parts of the world; communication by mail is slow; travelling distances may be considerable; so also the difficulties in finding suitable dates for hearings, deliberations etc.
    Costs. The long drawn-out procedure, especially on appeal, may make court litigation a costly business as far as the fees of the advocates are concerned, and also because the money you claim from the opposite party is tied up in the meantime. On the other hand, apart from fairly small court fees the services of the judges and the staff and the use of the

 

¹ The article is based upon a lecture given at a seminar on arbitration in Madrid in October, 1978. The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dr. Howard M. Holtsmann and other rapporteurs to the Mexico City congress mentioned in the text. Their papers were of great use to him when preparing his lecture. 

courtroom are free of charge. In an arbitration case you will have to pay in addition to the fee of your counsel and various other expenses also the fees of the arbitrators, which in big international cases may amount to considerable sums.
    I feel that it would be correct to say that arbitration sometimes — for instance when the arbitrators can draw upon their own knowledge of the trade concerned — but far from always is cheaper than litigation.
    Specialisation. A judge is supposed to be well versed in law, but every judge cannot possibly be a specialist in the techniques and customs of all the various trades. He will often have to rely on external expertise. And although the parties may be allowed under domestic law to designate in their contract a particular court as forum for possible disputes, they cannot decide which judge of that court shall hear their case.
    In arbitration the parties can choose as their "judges" persons who have the special knowledge and experience required, and in whom they have confidence.
    Privacy. Here arbitration has much to offer. There are many cases in which it is not in the interest of either of the disputing parties that strangers should be able to gain insight into their affairs. Even the mere fact that a business enterprise is involved in litigation may, if made public, be felt as a considerable drawback. Apart from a few cases involving special categories of confidential information, the courts rightly conduct the whole of their proceedings in full public view. This publicity may among other things create an inimical atmosphere between the parties and endanger their future collaboration.
    Flexibility and informality. Businessmen tend to regard court procedure as too rigid and formal. They often prefer to have their disputes settled in the relaxed and informal atmosphere of arbitration — where a hearing when properly conducted should be more like a round-table conference than a court trial, and where the will of the parties should govern the procedure to the greatest possible extent.
    Neutrality. It has been said that one of the reasons for the preference for arbitration in international disputes is "a possible reluctance of the parties to go to a foreign court in a far away country" (Professor Pieter Sanders in a lecture). This is certainly true when one of the parties is the Government or a State agency of that country. There is sometimes a feeling — mostly unfounded, I hope — that "State judges are not neutral — in the purest international sense of the world — in deciding international disputes in which the interests of their own country are at stake" (Professor Cremades in his above-mentioned paper). As the growth of trade has accelerated in recent years between capitalist and socialist countries and between industrialized and lesser-developed economies, arbitration — particularly in a third country different from the home of either party — is increasingly seen as the best available means of having adispute decided in a fair and objective way.
    Professor Cremades in his paper particularly stresses the advantages of so-called administered (institutional) arbitration over court litigation: it usually is a swifter, cheaper and technically superior solution. But of course much depends on the nature of the dispute and on the personal qualities of the arbitrators or the judges involved.

 

    Mr. Donald B. Straus, President of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Research Institute, in his keynote address to the above mentioned congress in Mexico expressed his belief in arbitration in these words when summing up:

 

Arbitration provides the best method for settling international commercial disputes. In fact, it is the only readily available method that is impartial, widely acceptable, and enforceable in most parts of the world.

 

Mr. Justice Donaldson, Chairman of the Commercial Court Committee which recently published a report proposing amendments to the British Arbitration Act, in a speech before the Institute of Arbitrators in London divided his preferences more equally between arbitration and litigation:

 

I have devoted a little time to the relative merits of arbitration and litigation in order to demonstrate that neither is superior to the other. The old man who stumped up and down in front of the Law Courts with a sandwich board reading 'Don't litigate — arbitrate' was wholly wrong. But he would have been equally wrong if he had moved down the road to the Institute's headquarters in Cannon Street and changed the message to 'Don't arbitrate — litigate'. We are partners in the same business. In some cases one will provide the better service. In other cases the other will.

 

Be that as it may: In any case it is obvious that the promotion of arbitration is essential for the furtherance of international business.

 

2. How to safeguard that the wish of contracting parties to arbitrate their disputes is respected?

 

Whatever the reasons of the parties to a particular dispute are for choosing arbitration instead of litigation, their wish should be respected to the greatest possible extent. It may be appropriate at this point to stress that arbitration and litigation are not at variance with regard to their objectives: to solve disputes in a fair and equitable way but also, in my opinion, within the framework of the applicable law. It is essential that the representatives of the one system, the judges, should not regard with suspicion or slight the activities of the other, the arbitration practitioners. As Mr. Justice Donaldson put it:

 

I am a judge. You are arbitrators. The only real difference is simply that I work in the nationalized or public sector of the industry. You work in the private sector. But it is the same industry — a service industry. Your aim and my aim is to serve our customers by reaching fair decisions according to law.

 

In his report on "Arbitration and the Courts" to the congress in Mexico Dr. Howard M. Holtzmann expresses the same idea in the following words:

 

For much too long some judges have looked upon arbitration and the courts as being competing legal processes. That has sometimes led courts to the mistaken belief that they must defend their position and prerogatives by decisions which limit arbitration. The purpose of this report is to demonstrate that arbitration and the courts are not competitive, but that they are complementary. Stated in a single word, arbitration and the courts are partners — partners in a system of international commercial justice. The objective of this historic partnership is to promote worldwide economic progress and, through the stability that is built upon trade and economic development, to enhance the prospects for world peace.

 

If the judges — in particular those interested in working on qualified legal problems — are jealous or hurt because the business world increasingly prefers to settle its disputes by arbitration, my advice would be that the judiciary should press the competent authorities into amending the court procedure rules so as to make litigation in court more attractive: swifter, cheaper, less formal. This is what we have done in Sweden. A Government commission is now investigating possible ways of reforming our Code of Civil and Criminal Procedure. The judiciary should not instead try and raise obstacles to arbitration.
    Although said to be partners, arbitration and court litigation are not placed on an equal footing at present. There are restrictions of various kinds preventing the businessman who prefers to arbitrate from getting what he wants.

 

(a) Statutory restrictions in domestic law (the question of arbitrability)

 

The courts will generally not enforce arbitration unless they consider that the subject-matter of the dispute is arbitrable under the national law of the forum. For example, the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards reflects this principle by providing that enforcement may be refused if a national court finds that "the subject-matter of the difference is not capable of arbitration under the law of that country".
    It is, therefore, important to remember that not everything can be arbitrated everywhere and that national laws vary widely as to the scope of what is arbitrable. You will find a rich flora of limiting provisions in the national reports published in the Yearbook of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA). Three volumes have been published so far (1976 — 78), and a fourth is being printed. Personally, I regard these books as indispensable to any person contemplating to enter into an international arbitration agreement, or handling internationalbusiness disputes as arbitrators or lawyers.
    In this connection I would like to quote once more Professor Cremades:

 

Do not forget that in some countries, and I still speak mainly of the Spanish speaking world, arbitration has had a bad press, often for political reasons, since it has been seen as an escape route, for transnational or multinational companies, from the courts of the host countries of the foreign investment. In other cases, for example the organisation of the Spanish courts during the Franco era, arbitration appeared to be opposed to the constitutionally desirable judicial monopoly of the State. Hence, the 1953 legislation, still in force while I write, put serious obstacles in the way of the development of arbitration. With the advent of democracy, the political and sociological precepts have changed, so that one is passing from absolute state supervision to the wish that it should be the parties concerned who directly or indirectly settle their disputes.

 

(b) Public policy restrictions

 

Sometimes arbitration is not expressly prohibited by statutory law but is found to be not permissible for reasons of public policy (ordre public). The

 

defence of public policy may be raised by a party for instance against an application for court recognition of an agreement to arbitrate, or for court enforcement of an award. If for example the enforcement of an award should be found to be contrary to the public policy of the forum, this would be a ground for refusing enforcement which is expressly stated, i.a., in the New York Convention and which is generally recognized in international practice.

 

(c) Narrow interpretation of "commercial" transactions

 

Many national arbitration statutes and international conventions refer to "commerce" and "commercial" transactions. Thus, for example, the U.S. Arbitration Act provides that arbitration is enforceable as to "transactions involving commerce" and that the New York Convention will apply to legal relationships "considered as commercial". Similary, the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration directs its attention to arbitration "with respect to a commercial transaction". The problem thus arises whether various modern transactions for investment, technology transfer and other types of economic development are to be considered as "commercial" and therefore within the proper scope of arbitration.
    In his report Dr. Holtzmann mentions some court cases where a "parochially narrow" view of the term "commercial" resulted in denying arbitration in disputes involving investment and technical assistance. He also points out that for instance in Latin America the word "commercial" is defined in some countries to exclude such transactions as investment contracts, licensing of technology, and mining.

 

3. How can obstacles now barring the desirable widening of the scope of arbitration be overcome?

 

(a) By legislative reforms

 

When restrictions on arbitrability have their sources in specific provisions of national constitutions and other statutory laws, the ability of judges to remedy the situation in individual cases is usually quite limited. In such countries judges should join those in business and legal circles who seek appropriate reforms so that the law will facilitate arbitration of transactions which promote economic growth and industrial development.

 

(b) By a more positive and co-operative attitude taken by the courts

 

(i) Restrictive application of public policy principles

 

Several writers on international arbitration have noted a modern trend among courts in various parts of the world to support a more restricted form of international public policy in arbitration cases; they seem to recognize that to do otherwise would place severe obstacles in the way of needed international commercial activity. I quote from Dr. Holtzmann's report:

 

Faced, as we are, with the potential problems of public policy defences in international arbitration cases, it is encouraging to be able to report that the defence is succeeding less and less in modern courts. Courts are increasingly recognizing that narrow, nationalistic grounds of public policy that might be properly applicable in domestic cases are inappropriate in international cases.

 

The report then refers to a statement by Professor Pieter Sanders, the present chairman of the ICCA:

 

More and more we see a distinction between domestic public policy (ordre public interne) and international public policy (ordre public international) gaining ground. The notion of the latter is more restricted than the former. International public policy, according to a generally accepted doctrine is confined to violation of really fundamental conceptions of legal order in the country concerned. For the sake of international commercial arbitration the distinction between domestic and international public policy is of great importance.

 

The principle that public policy is different in cases involving international arbitration from cases relating to domestic arbitration provides judges who recognize the desirability of supporting international arbitration with a rationale which permits them to do so, while at the same time preserving national public policy for use in domestic cases.
    Judges who are not familiar with the trends in modern international law should be informed of this growing tendency to distinguish between domestic and international public policy, and should be encouraged to do likewise.

 

A specific matter related to public policy is the desirable acceptance by the courts of arbitration cases being conducted in accordance with agreed rules such as the UNCITRAL Rules,¹ the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules, the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), etc., even though some of these rules may be contrary to provisions of their domestic procedural law. As Dr. Holtzmann points out, such rules are genereally prepared by highly respected institutions after careful study by representative groups of concerned parties. For example, the UNCITRAL Rules are the results of extensive consultation and represent a broad consensus of experts from many nations. And the established rules of other organizations reflect experience gained in thousands of international cases, and have been accepted in countless contracts. While individual parties might not consider all of the available rules to be equally desirable, it is extremely difficult to assert that any of them are fundamentally unfair or so violate basic concepts of justice as to be considered contrary to the public policy of any nation.

 

    For these reasons, and recognizing that rules are applicable only when their use has been mutually agreed to by the parties, it would seem proper that judges respond to the will of the parties and support arbitration conducted in accordance with rules which they have chosen.

 

¹ Rules adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in April 1976 and recommended by the United Nations in December 1976 at its 31st General Assembly for use in the settlement of disputes in the context of international commercial relations. 

(ii) A broader conception of what is a "commercial" transaction

 

Traditionally, international transactions consisted primarily of buying and selling goods. Today, however, some of the most important international transactions relate to projects which involve investments, use of natural resources, construction of factories, transfer of technology, and other forms of economic development.
    These modern transactions often require long-term contracts and the establishment of joint ventures. Courts have a great opportunity to remove obstacles to these vital forms of economic growth by recognizing that, although most national arbitration laws were written at a time when international commerce consisted mainly of purchases and sales, those laws should be progressively interpreted to support arbitration of the full range of modern business transactions.

 

4. Supervisory and appellate (review) functions of the courts

 

All systems of law — even those most favourable to arbitration — provide that the national courts shall have a supervisory jurisdiction over arbitration. I think that everbody agrees that such a jurisdiction is necessary. There must be an authority with power to assist the arbitrators when one of the parties refuses to execute his part of the arbitration agreement including the voluntary execution of the award, or to assist the parties when the arbitrators fail to perform their duties in accordance with law and equity.
    Generally speaking, the co-operation and support of a court may be necessary in three phases of arbitration: in recognizing agreements to arbitrate, in facilitating the conduct of arbitration cases, and in enforcing arbitration awards. In each of these phases the national law of many countries incorporates provisions of arbitration treaties to which the country has adhered. But nevertheless the intervention of judges may be needed to interpret and enforce those treaties, to define their relationship to the body of domestic law, and to determine questions covered by domestic law but not encompassed within the treaties.

 

(a) Barring litigation in court when there is a valid agreement to arbitrate

 

The first and most direct way in which a court can assist effective arbitration is by refusing to hear and decide a case whenever the contract of the parties provides for arbitration of the dispute. This fundamental principle is found in all modern legal systems — under common, civil and socialist law — as well as in major international arbitration conventions. When requested by a party to bar court procedure in order that arbitration may be held, the court should limit its scope of inquiry to the fewest possible questions, principally to the one whether or not the dispute is covered bya valid agreement to arbitrate. Otherwise, a party who seeks delay may been couraged to resort to the courts solely in the expectation that lengthy court proceedings will postpone the ultimate decision of the dispute.
    In this connection the so-called "doctrine of separability" should be

 

mentioned. It is important that the courts should consider that, as a matter of legal theory, the arbitration clause is separate from the rest of the agreement in which it is contained, and should permit the arbitrators to decide whether a valid contract exists. This doctrine is very clearly set forth for example in the UNCITRAL Rules:

 

The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to determine the existence or the validity of the contract of which the arbitration clause forms a part.... An arbitration clause which forms part of a contract and which provides for arbitration under these Rules shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.

 

(b) Facilitating the conduct of the case

 

In all matters dealt with under this heading it is important that the courts act as promptly as possible, so that arbitration is not delayed.

 

(i) Assistance in appointing arbitrators

 

One kind of support which courts are often requested to give to arbitration occurs when, pursuant to many national laws, they are called upon to appoint arbitrators because the parties cannot agree on a choice, and the contract fails to provide a method for appointing the arbitrator in such circumstances. Judges who are called upon to act in such matters have a serious personal responsibility, because the quality and expertise of the arbitrator will, to a large extent, determine the success of the arbitration. The modern trend is for national laws to permit arbitrators to be of any nationality. In international arbitration it is as a rule desirable that at least a sole arbitrator or the chairman of an arbitral tribunal be of an nationality other than the nationalities of the parties.

 

(ii) Assistance when arbitrators are challenged

 

After an arbitrator has been appointed, one of the parties may challenge his impartiality and independence. When the parties have not designated any rules to govern their case, or when a party is dissatisfied with the decision of an arbitration institution, the challenge must usually be determined by the court at the place of arbitration, a sensitive and delicate task. Both wise and swift decisions by judges in such cases are indispensable to public confidence in international arbitration.

 

(iii) Assistance in providing interim measures of protection

 

In the course of arbitration proceedings the need may arise for measures to safeguard the property which is the subject-matter of the arbitration. Modern arbitration rules often include provisions permitting arbitrators to order such interim measures of protection. But in some countries, the national law reserves this power exclusively to courts.

 

(iv) Assistance in securing evidence

 

Another area in which courts are called upon to assist the conduct of arbitration cases occurs in those countries where arbitrators do not have the power to administer oaths, or where the aid of courts is needed to order the appearance of witnesses and the presentation of documentary evidence. In such situations, the effective conduct of arbitration cases often depends on prompt co-operation by judges.

 

(v) Assistance in deciding questions of law

 

A special feature of arbitration in the United Kingdom — and other jurisdictions that follow British legal concepts — is what is known as the "special case stated" procedure, which reserves to the courts all questions of law in arbitration proceedings. When questions of law arise, either party, or the arbitrator, may "state" the legal question to the court and ask the court to rule on it. Issues of fact are decided by the arbitrator. This procedure contrasts sharply with the arbitration law in most other countries which gives arbitrators power to decide questions of law as well as issues of fact. I have wanted to mention this feature of British law but I refrain from going into any details, as there is great possibility of the British Arbitration Act being reformed in this respect fairly soon.

 

So much for the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. As for the power to review arbitration awards, it is my firm opinion that no appeal to a court should be allowed on the substance of the case, neither on points of law nor on points of fact. The parties have chosen to arbitrate and have agreed to abide by the decision of the arbitrator, in the appointment of whom they have taken part. They must then accept his opinion as far as the merits of the case are concerned.
    The power of the courts to review and set aside an award in my opinion should be limited to such grounds as that there was no valid arbitration agreement, or that the subject-matter of the dispute was not covered by that agreement or was not arbitrable under the applicable law, or that serious irregularities of procedure have occurred.
    I may mention that certain legislations make a difference between defects making an award null and void ipso jure — when no court action is necessary — and defects making the award challengeable within specified time limits. This matter will not be dealt with here, however.

 

What has now been said about the supervisory power of the courts does not always or in all respects apply to administered institutional arbitration where the agreed rules usually on many points provide for the assistance of another body than a court (the ICC Court of Arbitration, the Appointing Authority under the UNCITRAL Rules, the SCC Arbitration Institute, etc.). But then it is vital, as had already been stressed, that the courts are willing to respect and uphold the provisions of such rules.

 

(c) Enforcing arbitration awards

 

As previously stated, when parties choose arbitration for settling their disputes, they make a conscious and voluntary agreement to submit the issue to this procedure for final and binding decisions, in lieu of the courts. In theory, this means that once an agreement to arbitrate has been made, the issue should promptly be submitted to an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators whose decision, when rendered, settles the matter. There should be no further appeals or delays in the execution of the award.
    In practice, businessmen also usually comply voluntarily with arbitration awards. But there are exceptions. When a party refuses to obey the award, enforcement by a national court is needed. Such enforcement is in civil law systems typically by a grant of exequatur, while in common law jurisdictions it is known as "entering judgment on the award". The process of court enforcement is, in some countries, called "homologation". In all cases, by whatever name or procedure, the court enforces the arbitration award by giving the award the same force it would have had if it had been made by the court itself.
    Enforcement of arbitration awards is the subject of both bilateral and multilateral treaties, most notably the New York Convention to which nearly 60 countries have adhered. The grounds for refusal of enforcement set out in the New York Convention are few, and experience shows that enforcement of international awards is seldom refused by the courts of the contracting states. But there is a growing tendency for national courts to enforce international awards even when no treaty exists. The judiciary is apparently becoming more and more aware of the risk that the confidence of the international business community will be threatened — and the country's future international trade may be harmed — if it appears that the courts are taking a narrow nationalistic view of the case.

 

5. How to improve understanding and co-operation between the judiciary and the arbitration practitioners?

 

I have tried to demonstrate that understanding and co-operation between the judiciary and the arbitration practitioners are essential for the promotion of international commercial arbitration, and thereby for the promotion of international business as such.
    Methods for improving the relations between the two "partners" were discussed at the Mexico City congress. It was recommended that specific, practical ways to improve communications between them should be explored and developed. Regular international meetings for this purpose were suggested. Ways should also be considered in which judges, lawyers and businessmen could collaborate more closely on the national level in their own countries in the interest of improving arbitration practices and reforming arbitration law. Such efforts on the national level could serve two purposes: They could establish a firm foundation for international collaboration; and they could provide the necessary implementation for ideas and projects developed in international meetings.

 

    Professor Cremades submits that "one of the fundamental tasks of the institution or institutions, the creation of which is being considered in order to provide a framework for the arbitration movement in Spanish speaking countries, should be to organize and promote training in arbitration, starting at University level, and to promote courses for those who may in one way or another intervene in arbitration".
    If arbitration law is included as a compulsory subject for students at the faculties of law, even the future judges will have a basic knowledge of the matter. Judges should also be invited to participate in courses on arbitration, and to take an active part as lecturers or panellists at seminars. Articles on arbitration should be published in national law journals.
    I would like to add one further suggestion. Why not facilitate for judges to gain the best possible experience and understanding of arbitration by allowing them to act as arbitrators themselves?
    In many countries judges are prohibited from acting as arbitrators, either by statutory regulations or by codes of professional ethics. Even in Sweden the legislation earlier forbade certain categories of judges to accept nomination as arbitrators. Those obstacles have now been removed. It is for the judge himself, in the first place, to decide whether his participation in a particular arbitration case would endanger the reputation of his profession, or is likely to disqualify him from handling possible future cases in court, or would encroach too much upon the time he should spend on his ordinary work. So in my country there is now a widening group of judges who have had this practical training in arbitration, and who are asked by businessmen or their lawyers to sit on more important commercial cases as sole arbitrator or chairman of an arbitral tribunal. And especially in international "third country" arbitration — when the judge/the chairman should be of a nationality different from those of the parties — I can hardly conceive any reasonable objections against such a system from a legal or ethical point of view.
    One may ask whether a judge is likely to be an ideal arbitrator. His professional training may tend to make his approach to the dispute too rigid and formal, basing his decision more on a literal construction of a contract than on the spirit in which it was concluded, more on a strict application of a legal provision than on the customs of the trade. He may lack the flexibility and the will and capacity to bring about a friendly solution of the dispute — if necessary by a compromise — which I think is characteristic for a good arbitrator.
    I do not think that there is a general answer to such a question. Judges — as well as businessmen, technical experts and practising lawyers — may be more or less suited to serve as arbitrators, because of their personal qualities in general or of the nature of the particular case. It is in the first place the task of the parties to pick the right man for the right job.
    Besides, even the minds and behaviours of judges are susceptible to education and reform. This I know from personal experience. Shortly after the second world war — on leave from a post as assistant judge in a Swedish court of appeal — I served for many years as presiding judge of the commercial division of the High Court of Ethiopia. Conditions were primitive in every respect. Neither statutory legislation nor customary law

 

8—803352. Svensk Juristtidning

 

existed in the field of commerce and industry. Procedure rules were very rudimentary. So both court procedure and decisions on the merits of the cases had to be based on what in my opinion were internationally accepted legal principles. The most important lesson I learnt during this period of my life was, I believe, that there are many informal ways and means of reaching fair and equitable solutions of disputes; that it is not indispensable always to walk along the well-paved road of Swedish legislation to arrive at this goal. A good lesson for a future international arbitrator!
    So let me end this lecture by saying: Do not despair of the possibility to improve the relations between the judiciary and arbitration — by information, education, and practical training on both sides — to the benefit of the international business community. The chances are good.