International Law: Predicament of Enforcement

 

By BO JOHNSON, LL.D., Associate Professor of International Law

 

The very title of this article indicates contradictions. These may be semantic in character but may just as well have practical implications. If we try to define the concept "international law" we get fairly near if we say that this is a law between nations, rules of conduct governing the inter-relations in the Community of States. But how is it possible to enforce "international law" when it only consists of rules of conduct binding between equally sovereign nations? At the dawn of "international law", say during the 17th and 18th centuries, the modern "international law", or what is more correctly termed the "Law of Nations", took its present shape. In ancient times, however, nothing resembling "international law" existed. Through time history witnessed great empires ruling "the world", the Greek, the Roman empires, the Caliphate, just to take some conspicuous examples. These societies coexisted for a certain while but they did not develop anything like what we regard as "international law". They ruled and controlled their own spheres of the world. They imposed their rules and regulations over vast geographic areas. Their ambitions were great; the ultimate aim was a Pax Romana, a Pax Islamica to govern the whole world. Therefore, no need of an international law existed, since one day the world would be totally conquered.
    With Grotius the modern notion of "international law" emerged. It is based on the equal sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of each state. These conceptions are common goods nowadays, but they have existed for no more than a couple of hundred years. Owing to the European domination of the world, by the colonisation of the 19th century, these concepts were not applied on a world-wide basis until fairly recently: during the 20th century when new-born states are admitted to the international community. The old domination of the world by a few powerful states has ceased to be a reality in the legal sense. In the world of today there is no legal base—speaking in terms of international law—for certain nations to supervise and control other nations' affairs. In the 1970's the world order is—legally—based entirely on the principle of equality among independent and sovereign states. The inter-relationship between these is governed by what we term "international law". When

 

entering the Community of States new nations are obliged to follow the rules of the world order and if they do not, the question arises as to what to do with a country disobeying this order, or put in another way, disobeying the "international law".
    It is important to point out that "international law" differs essentially from the municipal law of states. The absolute sovereignty of a state was a well-known concept early in history, and it implied that inside the territory power was exclusively exercised by the Prince or the Supreme Authority. The sovereignty of a state meant that the Authority was entitled to legislate and to enforce legislation on the subjects of the state. If the subjects did not obey the internal order laid down in domestic laws, they could be tried before courts and sentences could be enforced and executed. If a subject succeeded to depart from his country before execution took place he was free because the exclusive sovereignty of the state could not be extended beyond its frontiers. There the sovereignty of other states took over.
    In international relations things are far more complicated. The world order enshrines rules of conduct. The members of the Community of States, just like members of domestic communities, are bound to behave in a special manner. If citizens of a state do not, the consequences are visible and obvious to all. But if members of the Community of States break the world order, the elementary rules of behaviour, everyone realizes that correction cannot be achieved only by invoking the rules of international law, because this law is merely a conglomerate of rules of conduct for equally sovereign states. If states are equal how can one state enforce "international law" on the other? This is a matter of semantics, but also of political realities. To be able to enforce "the law" on sovereign and independent states something more is required, namely the element of supranationality. This term should not be interpreted here in its extremity; it is used merely to illustrate the semantic difference between "international" and "supranational". The enforcement of law in the international society must, in its very essence, be related to the existence of supranational elements, because, as indicated, a single state is not competent to enforce "the law" on another equally sovereign state. We are trying to lay down the theoretical terms of reference and to obtain a semantic order; therefore, these matters are emphasized, but in reality we know that the right of self-defence legally entitles a state to take actions against a violator of the international world order. The right of self-defence, inherent in the corpus of "international law", is consequently a means of corrections in international law, exercised for the purpose of restoring order.

 

    Earlier, I made a reference to history. Formerly great powers controlled vast areas. During the evolution of the Law of Nations, especially when modern international law emerges, there were clear tendencies for groups of nations to form powerful blocs. A certain order existed within the bloc. A powerful bloc of nations was also in the position to extend its control and supervision over other areas. Nations acting in concert were strong and could pursue their policies, in concert they were able to intervene in world affairs, in concert they could punish violators of the world order among other—presumably weaker—nations.
    History has seen several groupings of nations; The Holy Alliance, The League of Armed Neutrality, the Entente Powers, etc. All of them were established for the purpose of defending themselves and to resist opposing groups. This represents a balance of power which upheld the legal order. It was a primitive world order. States, or rather blocs of states, adhered to some fundamental rules of international behaviour and if they did not, if they tried to expand to the disadvantage of other groups they had to face a military reaction. It is too early to talk about a "supranational" or even "international" legal order, because the enforcement of law among the nations of the 17th, 18th and even 19th centuries was based more or less entirely on the principle of tu quoque or what is sometimes termed the principle of "clean hands". "What you do I will do". States should be deterred from violating the order because of the consequences.
    History also shows that nations were not deterred from opening hostilities. If important interests were at stake they preferred to take the consequences. Hostilities and warfare could not be stopped. If a single state had reason to resort to military actions against another state it could always find some suitable arguments in the substance of international law. The right of self-preservation and the right of self-defence were frequently invoked by a violator and the violated state.
    It is after the First World War that new tendencies become apparent. Nations realize that "international law" cannot be enforced on a state by another state or by one bloc on another. A sovereign and independent state is not inclined to accept that other nations put themselves in the position of "international judge or police". If they do, the result may be disastrous and usually ends in war. With the forming of the League of Nations something new is introduced in the Law of Nations. The sovereign and the equal states join together, in an organization whose purpose is to prevent war and

 

preserve peace among nations. By signing the Covenant of the League of Nations, states become contractually bound to the principles enshrined therein. They agreed not to resort to war, to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. If external aggression nevertheless threatened a member, it was for the Council of the League to advise what actions "may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".
    The Covenant can be seen as an effort by the Community of States to introduce a new element into the corpus of international law, an element that aimed at facilitating the enforcement of the rules of international law against violators of the same law. That is to say, by joining together, by forming an organization on the basis of a voluntary contractual submission to the principles of the Covenant, the power of enforcement of the legal world order is vested in the organization. States pursued a policy of relinquishing some elements of their exclusive sovereignty to the organization. They were probably striving towards the element of supranationality, towards an organization that would be vested with power to enforce "the law" on each and every state. However, the strivings had to face political realities; the element of supranationality could never be put into operation. The members of the League were still sovereign states and although they had relinquished some parts of their sovereignty this was not enough to get the organization to function as a "law enforcing body". The fate of the League of Nations is known.
    After having witnessed the horrors of the Second World War, nations embark once again on the road of "supranationality". In the Charter of the United Nations of 1946 norms of international law are laid down as bases for the world order. Many of these principles were in existence before the Charter was drawn up, but they were only parts of the customary international law, something that had developed among states through time. Customary law was binding upon nations because nations felt they had to adhere to principles they regarded as being the law. The notion of opinio juris functions as the "law-binding" element. Certainly, principles such as those of reciprocity and tu quoque played their roles in forcing states to adjust their aspirations to realities. Among the principles of customary international law were the right of self-preservation and the right of self-defence. It is essential to mention these rights in this context because the fact is that only the latter was laid down as a guiding principle in the Charter, namely in Article 51. The right of selfpreservation was an explicit right of states in the old days of inter-

 

national customary law and it allowed states to take preventive actions if they felt threatened by another state. They could, so to say, resort to armed attack for the purpose of removing an imminent threat to their own security. They need not wait for the actual attack to take place—the threat was legally sufficient for recourse to military action. This is the wider notion of self-defence—to be legally entitled to take action because of threats—and this concept is theoretically still a norm of general international law, that is to say the corpus of law existing outside the legal framework of the United Nations Charter. However, when states signed the Charter, a documentwhich must be regarded as the inter-contract in the Community of States, they also relinquished this wider right of self-defence. The notion of self-preservation was made dormant and the principle of self-defence following an armed attack was enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs". In other words, to resort to actions in self-defence is only allowed when the attack actually occurs. I might add that the term "attack" is interpreted in many ways. This is nowadays the leading principle of international law as regards the rights of single states to resort to military action. The nations are contractually bound by this principle because they have put their signatures to the Charter and thus relinquished or at least suspended their inherent rights of self-preservation. In Article 2: 4 of the Charter it is further stated that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state".
    In spite of the high dignity of this rule it is a fact of life that threats or use of force frequently occur in international relations. Nations are not able, and never have been, to fulfil their contractual obligations when political interests are at stake. But if nations choose to violate the legal world order, as laid down in the Charter, they are subjected to a special procedure, also laid down in the Charter.
    The purpose of this is essentially to open the procedure of enforcement of international law. The violator, we presume, has signed the Charter, too, has accepted the procedure as such, has accepted the roles that are played by the separate organs of the United Nations. I want to emphasize that enforcement of law is made possible just because nations are contractually bound by the Charter. The concept "international law" may in this context be equated with the rules laid down in the Charter. These are the principles states are obliged to obey and these are the principles that may be enforced

 

upon violation. Rules of international law beyond the Charter, the so-called general international law, or the customary law, and there certainly are rules of this nature, cannot be enforced in the propersense because they do not fall within the legal framework of the Charter. It should be added, though, that also rules outside the Charter can be considered as the "law". Leading principles of general international law laid down in conventions, declarations and other resolutions could become part of the legal world order that may been forced by the special procedure of the Charter.
    I remarked at the beginning that we met with semantic contradictions when talking about the enforcement of international law. Equally sovereign nations cannot impose rules on one another. The norms of international law are rules of conduct for individual states. If a state violates one of these rules, other states may appeal to that very state to comply with the rules of international law, other states may in concert put pressure on the state by forming an international opinion. International opinion plays a major role in the shaping of normative rules for the Society of States, but merely on the long range. One should not forget the possibility of international mediation and conciliation, even decisions by the International Court at The Hague, but these methods depend entirely on whether the violator is prepared to resort to peaceful methods of settlement. We are in other words not talking about the "enforcement of law" when mentioning these possibilities of achieving peace and respect for the world order.
    However, it seems appropriate to speak in terms of the "enforcement of international law" in the case of the United Nations. But in my opinion it is only because of the structure of the Charter of that organization. It seems clear that the enforcement procedure contains elements of supranationality, i.e. a body of rules on a level above nations' own wishes. The international law, the legal and political world order, is being enforced on violators only because of this trait of supranationality. It is not one state against the other, it is not one state policing the world scene, it is not one state imposing "the law"on another. It is the Community of Nations that in concert, through the competent organs of the Organization, and on the basis of the contractual obligations of the Charter, enforce "the law". The law itself is not supranational, it is still the law governing the inter-relationship between equally sovereign nations, but the procedure for imposing the "law" is on the way towards supranationality. The power to intervene in situations of tension and to enforce the international legal order is vested in the Security Council. Its will may

 

legally be enforced on other nations.
    Since it is essential to avoid misinterpretations as to the real character of the enforcement procedure, it should be stressed that we are talking about "elements of supranationality". Supranationality in its proper sense means a will standing apart from all parties, imposing a supra-order on all nations irrespective of their own will. The United Nations has not reached the stage of supranationality in this sense and in point of fact it was never intended to reach it. A supranational world order, with far-reaching possibilities to enforce "the law" on single members of the Community by the Organization itself, is maybe something to strive for, but it is not a reality of today. If we, nevertheless, attribute a supranational touch to the enforcement procedure of the Charter, it means that the element of supranationality, which no doubt exists in the procedure, is basically dependent on how cooperation works between the Members of the Security Council. If the enforcement procedure is not put into operation, it is in fact nothing at all, just an empty phrase. And no matter how many elements of supranationality one attributes to the enforcement procedure as such, it does not help if this procedure does not work in practice. But if it functions, as envisaged, the international legal order—the international law—can be enforced. When it comes down to realities, and in the final analysis it always does, the international legal order is dependent on how the "condominium" between a few nations functions. If enforcement actions should be taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with coercive enforcement measures, these measures—with an indisputable supranational touch in their character—are made to materialize through the "condominium" over world affairs between the Members of the Security Council, or more essentially the "condominium" between the five permanent members, or even more essentially the "condominium" between the two world powers.
    It follows from what I have said that "the enforcement of international law", if this phrase is interpreted strictly according to its wording, that is to say as coercive enforcement, is entirely dependent upon the functioning of the Security Council. But as early as when the Charter was in its formative stage—in 1945—it was evident that the veto function was a sine qua non for the great powers to sign the Charter. They were not prepared to waive their exclusive sovereignty to an extent that would imperil their positions and influence over world affairs. They could not accept the pure supranational functions of the Council unless they themselves were in the position to protect their interests and to influence decisions. The political

 

element of the veto power is thus decisive when estimating the real possibilities of enforcing international law. In this context the question may be asked if it actually is "international law" that is enforced by decisions of the Security Council. Is it not rather decisions of a purely political character that are imposed? I do not intend to penetrate this complex question. May I only say that the decisions of the Council are taken with the aim to preserve the world order, to restore peace when aggression breaks out. By upholding the political order in the world fundamental rules of international law are being safeguarded.
    We have been referring in general to the enforcement procedure of the Charter and it is in this context we meet the conception of "peace-keeping", the concrete military or police operations carried out by contingents from different Member States. It is worthy of note that the term "peace-keeping" does not occur in the text of the Charter, it is merely a convenient general description of the role of United Nations forces spread over the world. No doubt, usage has given the expression a special legal-political meaning. We must at this point, however, make a very clear legal, though not practical, distinction between "peace-keeping" in the sense we are used to seeing these operations carried out and the "enforcement procedure" which is envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. According to Article 39 the Security Council is "to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". The Council shall furthermore make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security. The articles just mentioned are crucial in this respect; they are the real "law-enforcing" provisions of the Charter. Article 41 provides that the Council may, in the first place, decide measures not involving the use of armed force, e.g. complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communications, and even severance of diplomatic relations. If measures of this kind prove to be inadequate Article 42 may, in theory because this has never happened, be invoked: in accordance with this provision the Council may order action by air, sea or landforces "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". It is explicitly stated that such actions may include "demonstration, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces". It must be emphasized that measures like demonstrations of power, blockades etc. per se are parts of the general international law in the sense that they are known phenomena. Such

 

methods were formerly used under the aegis of international law, but nowadays single states are considered to be forbidden to utilize them.The only exception is when they are applied as enforcement measures by the Security Council under Article 42. The Community of States is allowed to use measures that otherwise are forbidden under present international law, characterized by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 49 of the Charter stipulates that the Members of the Organization shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council; in other words decisions by the Council to enforce international law are legally binding upon other Members, as also stated in Article 25.
    As indicated above the law-enforcing procedure is a perfect instrument for upholding the legal and political world order—if it functions. And the functioning of the Security Council is dependent on a sort of "condominium" between, primarily, the permanent members. The veto-power is the built-in political instrument by which the great powers protect their own interests. The constellations of power in the world of today are such that it is not possible for the Council to reach a unanimous decision on making use of the law enforcing articles. Or perhaps I should add that the balance of power has at least been characterized by a "dead-locked" Security Council. For more than two decades the picture has been predominated by a "paralysed" Security Council. In matters involving important interests for one of the blocs, the veto is cast, "paralysing" the processof decision as envisaged in the Charter. The Council may, in spite of this, arrive at some kind of decision; it mostly does, but the decisions are usually "watered" down, and there is no question even of invoking the law-enforcing Articles 41 and 42. The Council may escape "paralyzation" by utilizing Article 40, prescribing just provisional measures. But if "provisional measures" are inadequate the question arises as to what to do next? It is very likely, and this is also supported by actual events, that the Council will come to decisions when matters do not involve immediate interest of the great powers, and when it is "only" a question of "recommending" measures short of enforcement, like dispatching of police or surveillance forces, military supervisors or observers of armistices etc. Some examples are UNCI—the United Nations Commission for Indonesia—which came into being by a decision of the Council in 1947, UNTSO—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East, employed for the first time in 1948, UNMOGIP—the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan—which was formed

 

in 1949 to supervise the armistice line in Kashmir, UNFICYP, which was set up by the Council in 1964 to supervise order in Cyprus, UNIPOM, which came into existence by decision of the Council in 1965 following the Indian—Pakistani War. It is very important though, to stress that these operations were, and some still are, carried out with the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. It is merely a "peaceful settlement" of disputes and has nothing of the nature of "law enforcement". Before going into this in more detail, I should like to say a few words about what effects are exerted on international law as such when the Security Council does not function as envisaged in the Charter.
    It has been pointed out above that the right of self-preservation was and theoretically still is a principle of international customary law, that is to say, states may legally resort to military actions for removing an imminent threat to their own security. But by signing the Charter of the United Nations states voluntarily agreed to diminish their inherent right of self-preservation and only resort to self-defence when an attack actually occurred. Their contractual obligations "limit" the rights of states in this respect. When states signed the Charter, when they relinquished or at least suspended their rights under general international law, they took into consideration what role was going to be played by the Security Council in this respect. States could not, after signing the Charter, take military actions themselves if threats of aggression were to materialize; it was for the Council to take measures following such threats. The parties to the Charter count, or at least counted, upon the Council to act in situations like this. The assumption that the Council would function properly was perhaps so strong that it was a fundamental condition—a sine qua non—for a state to sign. If states relinquish rights they naturally want guarantees. The Council is—though still in theory—vested with power of enforcement, but this power cannot be used because of political implications. That is to say, an important prerequisite is somehow missing. The rebus-sic-stantibus doctrine maybe invoked here by states that consider themselves, so to say, "misled". What they had counted upon is not being accomplished. Because of this non-attainment of goals it is quite probable that statesmay revert to a reasoning that would lead to some sort of widening of the concept of self-defence as it was laid down in Article 51, or in other words if the intercontract between the members of the Community of States, i.e. the Charter, is not being properly applied, states may revert to the old customary international law, in which body of law the right of self-preservation is inherent. By applying this

 

principle anew states would feel legally competent to exercise the wider right of self-defence, wider than that allowed by Article 51 of the Charter because it also includes preventive actions in the face of threats. Should this happen the Security Council may be superseded by separate actions by single states. This would be a risky development, because it would imperil the whole structure of the Charter, and in the end it would mean that "enforcement of international law" would be back to the very old balance of terror based upon the principles of reciprocity and tu quoque. This is another example of what happens when provisions of "treaty-law" do not function as envisaged when the treaty was drawn up and signed—states revert to the old customary law. I venture to say that this phenomenon implies future difficulties for international law as such. There are several examples of how so-called "treaty-law", i.e. rules laid down in conventions following conferences etc., is not applied by states when it comes to the point. It may even happen that states taking an active part in the working out of conventions etc. do not adhere to the same convention when the question arises of whether to sign it or not. In my opinion serious consideration should be paid to this "disharmony" between "treaty-law" and general international law, because in the final analysis international law is what is actually applied in relations between states. I do not mean to say that the progressive shaping of international law by treaty-making is detrimental or anything like that. I merely want to point out that in this normative work due consideration must be given to realities. Only norms that really are applied by states become part of the corpus of international law.
    Having pointed out factors that may become a problem in international law in the future—as everyone realizes a development of this kind will lead to states themselves enforcing what they understand as international law—we should revert to the Charter of the United Nations, which document is after all not only a treaty of an ordinary kind but is also in the nature of a constitution for the Community of States.
    It goes without saying that the Member States of the United Nations just do not adopt the "wait and see" attitude when they see how the "law-enforcing" organ of the Organization becomes paralyzed time and time again. In fact Article 42 has never been applied by the Council, although the Soviet Union did propose measures under this article during the 1956 Suez crisis. On a number of occasions the Council has called for application of the kinds of measures prescribed in Article 42, but it has never cited that article

 

explicitly.
    The real "law enforcement", the enforcement of the legal world order upon violators has been kept dormant for several decades. The supranational element of law-enforcement is never put into operation. Actions under Chapter VII are rare, and are limited to recommendations to the parties involved in accordance with Article 39 or to provisional measures in accordance with Article 40. However, the concept "peace-keeping", in the above-cited sense, becomes more and more important since this seems to be the only alternative left to restore peace and order. Peace-keeping operations are ordered by the Security Council, but also, in practice, by the General Assembly. At times of Security Council "paralysis" matters may be referred to the Assembly for decisions by all the Member States. Peace-keeping does not come under the "enforcement heading", it has nothing to do with Chapter VII, rather with Chapter VI, which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter VI implies that the parties concerned are willing to cooperate, Chapter VI does not impose solutions on the parties. The Security Council is of course competent under the Charter to call upon parties to settle their disputes peacefully. The Council is furthermore within its rights to suggest methods of settlement, and in this context "peace-keeping" procedures may be recommended, i.e. dispatching of observers etc. to supervise armistices. It is true that Chapter VI does not mention the Assembly as being competent to take decisions on peace-keeping matters. But a practice has developed whereby the Assembly may in special circumstances take decisions on peace-keeping measures. As far back as in 1950, during the Korea crisis, when the Security Council acted in Soviet absence, the Assembly passed a so-called "uniting for-peace-resolution", stating that in the event of a "paralysed" Security Council, the Assembly should immediately consider the matter and recommend its members to take suitable collective action, including the use of armed force, for the purpose of restoring peace. The competence of the Assembly to decide measures involving the use of armed force has been contested, mainly by the Soviet Union and France, countries which maintain that only the Security Council is competent under the Charter to decide on measures involving the use of armed force. This argument is met with another argument: "peace-keeping" is put in operation only after the consent of the parties involved has been obtained. That is not a question of enforcement of law on an aggressor, which is the purpose of Chapter VII, it is merely a police operation with the consent of the parties under the heading "peaceful settlement of disputes". Article 24 also

 

states that "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" rests with the Security Council. The word "primary" should be emphasized. This implies that the residual and over-all responsibility for peace in the world rests with the General Assembly, the only organ of the United Nations where all the members are represented.
    I do not intend to penetrate more deeply into the substance of this conflict of competence between the organs of the Organization. Since realities in the world are as they are, excluding the pure "law-enforcing" procedure, it suffices that a constitutional development in the United Nations has made it possible to apply some methods for restoring peace and order. Although "peace-keeping" operations are not legally considered "enforcement of international law" and inspite of the fact that consent of the parties involved is necessary, these operations come very close to "enforcement of the legal world order". It has sometimes been said that "peace-keeping" goes under Chapter "six and a half" of the Charter. These operations worked rather well in practice. During the Suez crisis in 1956 the UNEF—United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East—came into being by a "uniting-for-peace-resolution" in the Assembly. A "uniting for-peace"-procedure was also applied when the United Nations operations in the Congo started in 1960; this procedure led to the famous "Article 19 crisis", involving the question of payment for operations of this kind.
    It is of course important to note that measures of a "peace-keeping" nature, which in my opinion in practice resemble "enforcement measures", do not work very well if consent is not given or if consent is withdrawn. This happened in the Middle East during the 1967 war; Egypt withdrew its consent for the UNEF forces to stay on Egyptian soil. Secretary-General U Thant immediately ordered their withdrawal on the ground that the United Nations could not defy the will of the host country unless the Security Council authorized the forces to stay as a measure of enforcement under Chapter VII. This was of course impossible. It is argued, however, that the Egyptian request was a breach of the "pledge of good faith" exchanged between Egypt and the United Nations when UNEF forces were employed in the area in 1956.
    Recent developments in world politics, especially the climate of détente, give cause for some interesting observations. The Soviet Union has chosen a policy of relaxation of tension between the two blocs. In an atmosphere of cordiality the two great powers of the world exchange views on world affairs, they conclude treaties of

 

28—753005. Svensk Juristtidning 1975

 

strategic importance. The days of the cold war seem to be over. Even during the October events in the Middle East the atmosphere of collusion between the world powers remained, in spite of serious events that could easily have shattered what had so far been accomplished between these countries.
    The two blocs are seemingly in the process of consolidating themselves and pursuing a policy of relaxation and "peaceful coexistence" towards each other. This development has influence on the possibilities of enforcing the legal world order. If the "condominium" between all the members of the Security Council really works, the Council will function as envisaged in the Charter. If the great powers want to reactivate the real "law-enforcing" articles under Chapter VII they are able to do so. In such events the will of these powers is decisive in world affairs—also in terms of enforcement of international law—because they only utilize the provisions of the Charter, the legally binding document between the members of the Community of States. A development of this kind will of course limit the functions of the General Assembly. In coming days perhaps no "uniting-for-peace-resolutions" will be necessary or even possible. The legal world order will be enforced through the concerted action by the great powers in the Security Council. Recent events in the Middle East underline these conclusions; the new UNEF force was established exclusively by the Security Council and placed under the exclusive authority of the Council. This is, however, something that entirely corresponds to the real intentions behind the Charter, clear to all signatories of the U.N. Charter from the very beginning. One should not forget, though, that also small states are members of the Council and exert influence in world affairs.